Hyper-Theory-of-Mind in Children with Psychotic Experiences by Clemmensen, Lars et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Hyper-Theory-of-Mind in Children with Psychotic Experiences
Clemmensen, Lars; van Os, Jim; Skovgaard, Anne Mette; Vaever, Mette; Blijd-Hoogewys, Els





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2014
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Clemmensen, L., van Os, J., Skovgaard, A. M., Vaever, M., Blijd-Hoogewys, E. M. A., Bartels-Velthuis, A.
A., & Jeppesen, P. (2014). Hyper-Theory-of-Mind in Children with Psychotic Experiences. PLoS ONE,
9(11), [e113082]. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0113082
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Hyper-Theory-of-Mind in Children with Psychotic
Experiences
Lars Clemmensen1*, Jim van Os2, Anne Mette Skovgaard3, Mette Væver4, Els M. A. Blijd-Hoogewys5,
Agna A. Bartels-Velthuis6, Pia Jeppesen1
1Child and Adolescent Mental Health Center, Mental Health Services, the Capital Region of Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2Department of Psychiatry and Psychology,
Maastricht University Medical Centre, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 3Department of Public Health, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark, 4Department of
Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark, 5 INTER-PSY Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands, 6University of Groningen, University Medical Center
Groningen, University Center for Psychiatry Groningen, Groningen Triadegebouw, The Netherlands
Abstract
Background: Alterations in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) are associated with psychotic disorder. In addition, studies in children
have documented that alterations in ToM are associated with Psychotic Experiences (PE). Our aim was to examine
associations between an exaggerated type of ToM (HyperToM) and PE in children. Children with this type of alteration in
ToM infer mental states when none are obviously suggested, and predict behaviour on the basis of these erroneous beliefs.
Individuals with HyperToM do not appear to have a conceptual deficit (i.e. lack of representational abilities), but rather they
apply their theory of the minds of others in an incorrect or biased way.
Method: Hypotheses were tested in two studies with two independent samples: (i) a general population sample of 1630
Danish children aged 11–12 years, (ii) a population-based sample of 259 Dutch children aged 12–13 years, pertaining to a
case-control sampling frame of children with auditory verbal hallucinations. Multinomial regression analyses were carried
out to investigate the associations between PE and ToM and HyperToM respectively. Analyses were adjusted for gender and
proxy measures of general intelligence.
Results: Low ToM score was significantly associated with PE in sample I (OR= 1.6 95%CI 1.1–2.3 x2(4) = 12.42 p = 0.010), but
not in sample II (OR = 0.9 95%CI 0.5–1.8 x2(3) = 7.13 p = 0.816). HyperToM was significantly associated with PE both in
sample I (OR= 1.8, 95%CI 1.2–2.7 x2(3) = 10.11 p = 0.006) and II (OR = 4.6, 95%CI 1.3–16.2 x2(2) = 7.56 p = 0.018). HyperToM
was associated particularly with paranoid delusions in both sample I (OR = 2.0, 95%CI: 1.1–3.7% x2(4) = 9.93 p= 0.021) and II
(OR = 6.2 95%CI: 1.7–23.6% x2(4) = 9.90 p = 0.044).
Conclusion: Specific alterations in ToM may be associated with specific types of psychotic experiences. HyperToM may
index risk for developing psychosis and paranoid delusions in particular.
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Introduction
A systematic review [1] documents that alterations in Theory-
of-Mind (ToM) are found in people at familial risk of psychotic
disorder. In addition, longitudinal studies propose that individuals
who later develop schizophrenia, show ToM deficits in childhood
[1]. Therefore, altered ToM may constitute an underlying, partly
genetically mediated [1,2], indicator of vulnerability for develop-
ment of psychosis and schizophrenia [1,3]. Recent studies in adult
samples of both patients and individuals at familial risk of
psychosis [4–9] have found altered ToM abilities to be associated
not only with a diagnosis of schizophrenia but also, and more
specifically, with specific psychotic symptoms [10–12]. However,
these findings are diverging with regard to which ToM deficits are
associated with which symptoms.
Hallucinations, delusions and other psychotic symptoms in the
absence of diagnosable psychotic illness occur frequently in the
general population. Recent meta-analyses found a median
prevalence of such non-clinical Psychotic Experiences (PE) of
around 7% in the general population of all ages [13], and around
17% in the subgroup of children aged 9–12 years [14]. PE are
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usually transitory, but longitudinal cohort studies have shown an
association with later development of psychotic illness, indicating
that PE may index psychometric risk for psychotic disorder [13–
16].
PE and alterations in ToM are associated with each other
[9,17], but studies have for the most part been carried out in adult
samples, and only three studies have examined these associations
in non-clinical samples of children [18–20]. In two of the studies
involving children, associations were found between current PE
and poor ToM [18,19]. In the third study, the overall score of
ToM did not differentiate between children with and without PE
[20]. However, in this study, lower ToM scores mediated the
association between a lifetime history of auditory verbal halluci-
nations (AVH) and presence of delusions at age 12–13 years, i.e.
children with AVH had a higher likelihood of forming secondary
delusional ideation given lower ToM skills. This is in line with the
other longitudinal study [18] finding that poor ToM at age 5 years
predicted PE at age 12 years.
The divergence in findings regarding which symptoms of
psychosis are related to ToM may be related to methodological
dissimilarities across studies, e.g regarding the measurement of
ToM and the classification of symptom clusters [1,21,22]. A more
basic explanation may involve the heterogeneity and multidimen-
sionality of ToM as a construct [23]. It has been suggested that
deficits may occur in (i) the representational abilities (i.e. a
conceptual deficit), so that an individual is unaware that others can
hold a false belief about a state of affairs [24,25], as well as in (ii)
application abilities (i.e. deficit in performance), so that an
individual has awareness of another person’s mental life but fails
to demonstrate or apply this knowledge due to processing
constraints [26]. Frith (2004) suggested that schizophrenia patients
with predominantly negative symptoms, disorganized behaviours,
and early developmental problems lack representational abilities,
whereas patients with paranoid symptoms would have the basic
representational abilities but tend to excessively attribute inten-
tions or self-referential meaning to others and therefore predict
behaviour on the basis of these wrong beliefs [27]. This may be
conceptualized as HyperToM, which refers to an exaggeration in
the application of ToM [28]. Studies of both clinical [29] and
general population [30] adult samples suggest that HypoToM is
associated with a diagnosis of autism and negative symptoms
[1,29,31], whereas HyperToM is associated with psychotic
disorder [31] and psychotic symptoms [29,32]. This type of
erroneous ToM strategy appears to be specifically associated with
delusions and particularly paranoid delusions comprising delusions
of persecution, mind-reading and misinterpretation [29,30,32].
Thus, HyperToM may be a useful conceptual construct to
improve the current insufficient differentiation between the
various qualitative aspects of ToM [33] that may show different
patterns of association with different developmental disorders [34].
While a limited number of studies on the presence of
HyperToM in patients with psychosis have been carried out, no
studies in at-risk individuals have systematically investigated this
aspect of social cognition [33].
The aim of the present study was to examine the specific
patterns of alterations in ToM (HyperToM) in relation to PE in
children, in order to expand current knowledge on the role of
ToM in the aetiology of psychosis.
Research Hypotheses
We hypothesized that:
1. A lifetime history of PE would be more frequent in the group of
children with overall ToM score at or below the median (Low
ToM) compared to the group of children with ToM score
above the median (High ToM) of the general population of
children.
2. A lifetime history of PE would be particularly frequent in the
group of children with the exaggerated type of ToM alteration
(HyperToM) compared to children without this type of
alteration.
3. The exaggerated type of ToM alteration (HyperToM) would
be associated more strongly with a lifetime history of paranoid
delusions (Pa) compared to a lifetime history of psychotic
experiences without paranoid delusions (PE-NonPa).
Figure 1. Overview of the study.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0113082.g001
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Methods
An overview of the study is presented in Figure 1.
The hypotheses were investigated in two studies covering two
independent samples: (i) a general population sample of 1630 11–
12-year-old Danish children [35] and (ii) a population-based
sample of 259 12–13 year-old Dutch children, pertaining to a case-
control sample of children aged 7–8 years when assessed for
auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) and 12–13 years when
followed up for assessment of PE [20].
Participants
Study I: The Danish general population sample of
children aged 11–12 years. The current analysis was con-
ducted as part of the 11–12-year follow-up of The Copenhagen
Child Cohort 2000 (CCC2000). CCC2000 is a general population
birth cohort, consisting of 6090 children born in 16 municipalities
in the Copenhagen County in the year 2000, and followed
prospectively since birth [36]. The cohort comprises 9% of all
children born in Denmark that year, and is representative for
children born in Denmark that year regarding key perinatal
characteristics (Olsen, Skovgaard, Weile, & Jorgensen, 2007),
except that ethnic minorities were somewhat overrepresented at
baseline [36].
The study was conducted from May 1st, 2011 through October
1st, 2012. Cohort members were traced through The Danish Civil
Registration System. 1.243 children were lost to follow-up (19
dead, 217 emigrated, 14 not traceable, and 993 whom had
claimed ‘research protection’), leaving a total of 4847 children
eligible for follow-up at age 11/12 years. The parents of eligible
children were contacted by letter inviting them to sign up their
child for a face-to-face assessment at the research clinic. Families
living far away were offered home visits. Parents were contacted
up to four times by letter and/or telephone. Gifts were offered in
reward for participation. It was clearly stated that participation
was voluntary and that data was kept confidential.
1632 children attended the assessment. Two of those had an
incomplete ToM task, resulting in a final sample of 1630 children
(34% of the eligible children, 48% boys). The mean age was 11.4
years. In a previous study of PE in the CCC2000 [35], the
participating children were found to be slightly positively selected
on a range of sociodemographic and perinatal background
characteristics compared to the rest of the cohort (those alive at
age 11 years).
Study II: Case-control sample of auditory verbal
hallucinations. Sample II was recruited from a case-control
sample of 694 children, half of whom had AVH when assessed at
age 7 or 8 years as part of a population-based study of 3870
children. A total of 337 children from the case-control sample
participated in the follow-up at age 12–13 years, in which 259
(49% of the eligible children, 47% boys) completed the ToM
assessment (Bartels-Velthuis et al., 2011b). Mean age was 13.1
years (SD 0.5). Socioeconomic status was evenly represented (31%
low 38% middle, 31% high). The 78 children, in whom ToM was
not assessed, more often were 13 as opposed to 12 years old (73%
vs. 54% in the group with ToM assessment; (x2 = 9.3, p= 0.002)
and more often reported delusions (40% vs. 27% in the group with
ToM assessment; x2 = 4.3, p = 0.04). No other large or significant
differences existed in demographic or outcome variables [20].
Materials
Theory of Mind. The ToM Storybook Frederik (ToM-F)
[37] was used to assess ToM in both studies. ToM-F is the Danish
version of the ToM Storybook Frank [38] and is aimed at 10–14-
year-old children and tests the understanding of second-order false
beliefs, white lie, irony, double bluff and ‘faux pas’ (a socially
awkward or tactless act). The children are asked a total of 24
questions while being presented with 16 pictures and listening to
the storybook read aloud.
Originally, 32 questions were included but 8 questions where
omitted in sample I. This reduction was done to adapt to the
present study where the task was part of a larger assessment
battery and thus needed to be shortened to keep the total time for
the clinical assessment at a reasonable level, and minimize the
strain on the children. The questions omitted were the ones
producing the least differentiation between the children in a
previous study [20]. To make direct comparison between sample I
and II possible, analyses were carried out only on the 24 questions
applied in both studies. As ToM scores on 8 questions from the
original study thus were excluded from the data in sample II, ToM
scores will not be identical to those reported in a previous
publication [20] concerning sample II.
In both samples, the internal consistency between the 24
questions was moderate (sample I Cronbach’s alpha= .69, sample
II Cronbach’s alpha= .64). The 24 questions consist of 16 ‘test’
and 8 ‘justification’ questions. The test answers are scored 0–1; 1 is
given for a correct understanding of the situation (range 0–16).
The 8 justification answers are classified according to 23
predefined categories (see ‘‘Appendix S1 Rating Categories for
ToM Storybook’’ for full set of categories) [39] such as:
Desire: The answer refers to the protagonist’s desire with
respect to the situation. It involves wanting or desiring something.
Fact belief: The child refers to the protagonist’s knowledge. It
involves thinking, knowing, being sure of, expecting or recogniz-
ing.
Situational: Dwelling on the situation without reference to the
mental state of the protagonist.
Based on these categories, the answers were scored (‘0’, ‘1’, ‘2’,
and for some items ‘3’) on an ordinal scale predefined for each
situation, resulting in a justification sum score (range 0–20), that
was summed with the test score (‘0’ or ‘1’, range 0–16) to form the
total ToM scale score of ToM abilities (range 0–36). Scores on the
justification items depend on the level and quality of references
made to the thoughts, beliefs, feelings or intentions of the story
characters or the child itself.
The total ToM scale served as the primary measure of overall
ToM abilities. The 8 justifications answers were also scored on a
dichotomous scale as a non-mentalizing (‘0’) or mentalizing (‘1’)
type of answer, regardless of the classification of the answer as
formally right or wrong in the context, resulting in a mentalizing
scale-score (range 0–8). Conform previous work, mentalizing
answers were defined as those referring to beliefs, desires and
similar inner states [30,33]. Thus the following 11 of the 23
categories were considered mentalizing: Belief; desire; fact belief;
value belief; mental state verb rest category; own frame of
reference with mental state; emotion with empathy; emotion
without empathy; perception with mental state; identification of
first order intention; identification of second order intention (see
Appendix S1 for a description of all categories). A high number of
mentalizing answers (High-Mentalizing) was defined as scores
above the median for population sample I.
From these scale scores we defined low ToM skills (Low ToM)
as scores at or below the median on the total ToM scale.
HyperToM was defined on the basis of (i) total ToM scale score
below the median combined with (ii) number of mentalizing
answers above the median in general population sample I. Both
measures were taken into account, as the aim was to capture
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children that had a low level of overall ToM abilities while making
frequent mental attributions. Taking both measures into account,
a categorical variable was constructed, which captured children
who were among the top 50% with regard to number of
mentalizing answers, while at the same time among the lowest
50% with regard to overall ToM abilities measured by the total
scale score These children showed a tendency to exaggerated and
aberrant mentalizing explanations, labelled HyperToM, in con-
trast to the children without HyperToM. The phenotype should
not be conceptualised as somewhere between high and low levels
of overall ToM abilities, rather it is another dimension of ToM
skills that was measured as a dichotomised variable. The median
cut-offs from sample I (n = 1630) were also applied to assess
HyperToM in sample II, thus providing the opportunity to
replicate an association between this level of HyperToM and the
presence of PE. The aim was to explore associations between the
same quality of HyperToM, captured by this definition, and the
presence of PE. Sample I was chosen to provide the level of cut-off,
as this was the larger and most representative sample of children in
the general population.
Ratings were carried out in close co-operation with the Dutch
authors of The ToM Storybook Frederik (ToM-F). An initial
training seminar was conducted. Thereafter consensus ratings on a
subsample of 200 children were carried out by a Danish rating
group headed by the first author, and subsequently the remaining
children were rated by the first author under supervision of the
Dutch authors. A sample of 50 children was rated separately by
one member of the Danish research group in order to measure the
inter-rater reliability for assignment of children to each ToM
group. The inter-rater reliability (computed as Cohen’s Kappa)
was very good for the categorizing of children as low ToM
(kappa= 0.86) and as HyperToM (Kappa= 0.81) [44,45].
Socioeconomic status. In Sample I socioeconomic status
(SES) was derived from length of mothers’ education and family
disposable income. Low SES was set as low-skilled mother (length
of education less than 10 years) and/or low family income (being
in the lowest quartile of the entire cohort of 6090 children).
In Sample II SES was derived from parental averaged
educational levels and family income, resulting in three levels:
low (score = 1), middle (score = 2) and high (score = 3).
General Cognitive ability. As previous studies have pointed
to the possibility that the association between schizophrenia and
ToM performance may be confounded by general intelligence
[1,40], any study investigating cognitive mechanisms in psychosis
should take the possible influence of general cognitive abilities into
account [9]. Thus, measures of general cognitive ability were
treated as a potential confounder of the association between ToM
and PE in both studies.
In Sample I performance on the Block Design (BD) subtest of
WISC-III was used as a proxy measure of children’s general
cognitive abilities. The BD subtest is highly correlated with full-
scale IQ in the Wechsler intelligence test [41].
In Sample II secondary school level was categorized as follows:
1 (lower vocational) and 2 (higher/pre-academic) and was applied
as a proxy measure of children’s general cognitive abilities. This
was not possible for 12 of the children, as 10 were still at primary
school and data were not available for 2.
Psychotic Experiences. In Sample I PE were assessed in a
semi-structured interview with K-SADS-PL [42], applying the
screening section and the supplement on psychotic symptoms.
Possible PE ratings were: absent, likely present, and definitively
present. PE were rated present if at least one psychotic symptom
was scored as ‘likely’ or ‘definitely’ present for two time periods:
the past month and ‘lifetime before’. For the present study, a
binary variable was created, coding ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ PE for the
lifetime period, ‘yes’ indicating that the child had experienced at
least one psychotic symptom ‘likely’ or ‘definitely’ present in last
month and/or in the lifetime before. The subgroup of children
with delusional thoughts with paranoid content (Pa) were a priori
defined as those with scores of likely or definitely present delusions
of persecution, mind-reading and/or receiving messages from
TV/radio, as these delusions have a clear paranoid content and
can be reliably assessed in the general adolescent population [43].
Trained professionals including 2 psychologists, 3 medical doctors,
1 psychology graduate student and 1 medical student performed
the interviews. All interviewers were trained by the senior
researcher (PJ) and participated in regular training seminars
supported by video-taped interviews, and including group
discussions, ratings and supervision in order to obtain high inter-
rater reliability in the observer-based ratings of the presence of
psychotic symptoms, while taking into account attributions of
symptoms to sleep, somatic disorders or toxic influences. If there
was a clear attribution explaining the experience, the psychotic
symptom was rated as not present. Based on 75 videotaped
interviews, the inter-rater reliability was computed as Fleiss’
Kappa for assignment of children to each group based on life-time
presence of PE symptoms. The inter-rater reliability was very good
for both the grouping into children with or without PE (Fleiss
Kappa= 0.95) and the further grouping into 1) healthy children
(NonPE) 2) children with Psychotic Experiences but no delusional
thoughts with paranoid content (PE-NonPa) and 3) children with
Psychotic Experiences that include delusional thoughts with
paranoid content Pa (Fleiss Kappa= 0.85) [44,45].
In Sample II PE were assessed using the screening question on
AVH from the Auditory Vocal hallucination Rating Scale
(AVHRS; [46]) and three items on delusional experiences from
the Adolescent Psychotic Symptom Screener (APSS); [43]. The
AVHRS is a structured 16-item interview evaluating experiences
on AVH during a predetermined period (e.g. past month, past
year). As opposed to the K-SADS applied in sample I, AVHRS
only assess auditory Hallucinations. Each item consists of a
compulsory question, followed by optional support questions.
Items are scored on a 5-point scale, ordered in increasing severity,
facilitating calculation of a severity score AVHRS [46]. The APSS
items consist of questions on delusions (mind reading, persecutory
delusions and receiving media messages). AVH were rated as: 0
(no) or 1 (yes) and were assessed at baseline over the past year and
at follow-up over the five intervening years. Delusions were rated
as: 0 (no), 1 (yes, likely) or 2 (yes, definitely) and were assessed over
the lifetime [43]. A variable was constructed indicating presence of
at least one (definite) delusion (hereafter: delusions). As in sample I,
Pa was defined as any delusion of persecution, mind-reading and/
or receiving messages from TV/radio. Based on the 337 children
attending this part of the assessment, interrater reliability for AVH
was good (kappa= 0.88).
Statistical analysis
Analyses were carried out using Stata 12 software (StataCorp
LP, College Station, TX). Descriptive statistics were used to
analyse sample characteristics. Group differences on demographic
variables, ToM scores as well as the proxy measures of general
cognitive ability were tested by chi-squared tests for categorical
variables and by independent samples t-tests for continuous
variables.
Logistic regression analyses were conducted with HyperToM,
ToM total score, low mentalizing, gender and the proxy measures
of general cognitive ability (BD respectively ‘‘school level’’) as
independent variables. In each logistic regression analysis, the
Hyper-Theory-of-Mind in Children with Psychotic Experiences
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 November 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 11 | e113082
predictive effect of each of the ToM scale scores was estimated
while adjusting for the proxy measures of general intelligence.
The logistic regression analyses were used to estimate 1) the risk
of having a lifetime presence of PE (yes/no) for the group of
children with low ToM compared to the group of children with
high ToM in the two samples; and 2) the risk of a lifetime presence
of PE (yes/no) for the group of children with HyperToM
compared to those children without HyperToM in the two
samples. The relative risk was calculated as odds ratio (OR) with
95% CI.
Finally, multinomial logistic regression analyses were used to
estimate the dose-response relationship between HyperToM (yes/
no) and having a lifetime history of paranoid delusions (Pa), a
lifetime history of psychotic symptoms without paranoid delusions
(PE-NonPa), and no lifetime history of PE. The hypothesis being
tested was that the risk for Pa versus no PE when exposed to
HyperToM would be higher than the risk for PE-NonPa versus no
PE when exposed to HyperToM.
Thus, the estimated ORs express the risk of experiencing Pa
relatively to no PE, and the risk of experiencing PE-NonPa
relatively to no PE for children with HyperToM compared to the
children without HyperToM. All analyses of risk of HyperToM
status were repeated substituting HyperToM as predictor with
each of the underlying dimensions of HyperToM, i.e. low ToM
score and high mentalizing answers in order to be able to compare
the OR of HyperToM to the OR of these variables. All
multinomial logistic regression analyses were adjusted for gender.
Post-estimation analysis was carried out to examine if the
estimated OR of HyperToM for Pa was significantly different
from the OR of HyperToM for PE-NonPa.
Ethics
The Danish study (sample 1) was approved by The Danish Data
Protection Agency (J.nr.2010-41-4438), the Capital Region of
Denmark (J.nr. 2007-58-0015), and The National Committee on
Health Research Ethics was consulted (J.nr.H-C-FSP-2010) in
accordance with national guidelines. The written information for
sample 1 clearly stated that 1) study participation is voluntary 2)
consent can be withdrawn at any time and 3) all data will be de-
identified. Parents and child agreed to participate by signing up for
the face-to-face assessment of child at the hospital. This consent
procedure was approved by the ethics committee.
In the Dutch study (sample 2) written informed consent was




Psychotic Experiences. A total of 171 (10.5%) of the 1630
children reported lifetime PE. The further subgrouping of these
171 children based on the presence or absence of Pa yielded a Pa
group of 70 (41%) children, and a PE-NonPa group of 101 (59%)
children (Table 1). There were no significant differences regarding
age or gender between either the PE and Non-PE groups, or
between the Pa and PE-NonPa groups (Table 2).
Table 1. Demographic, ToM and PE data from sample I and sample II.
Sample I Sample II
N 1630 259
Age in months 137 159
Gender (% boys) 782 (48) 122 (47)
Low Socioeconomic status N(%) 382 (23) 80 (31)
General cognition
Block Design (M, SD) 9.7 (3.9) -
School Level - Lower vocational (N, %) - 135 (55)
ToM score




Mean (SD) 3.3 (1.5) 3.8 (1.7)
Range 0–8 0–8
Median 3 3
HyperToM 202 (12%) 21 (8%)
Psychotic Experiences (PE) 171 (10.5%) 156 (60%)
Hallucinations 68 (40%) 85 (55%)
Delusions 26 (15%) 22 (14%)
Both 77 (45%) 49 (31%)
Psychotic Experiences
PE-NonPa 101 (59%) 85 (54%)
Pa 70 (41%) 71(46%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0113082.t001
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Theory-of-Mind Frederik. The median ToM score was 19
and the median for number of mentalizing answers was 3
(Table 1). Based on these numbers, a total of 827 (51%) were
classified as having low ToM, and among these 202 (12%) children
were classified as having HyperToM. There were no significant
differences in neither gender (47% vs 48% boys x2(1) = 0.1310,
p = 0.717) nor age (139 vs 139 months t(1628) = 1.0381,
p = 0.2994) between the groups with and without HyperToM.
Proxy General Intelligence: Block Design. There were no
significant differences on BD score between the PE and NonPE
groups, and similarly no differences between the Pa and PE-
NonPa groups. The group of children with high ToM had a
significantly higher BD Score than the children with low ToM
(Table 2). The HyperToM group (mean= 9.1, SD=3.7) had a
significantly lower BD score than the Non-HyperToM group
(mean=9.8, SD=3.8, t(1628) = 2.6978, p = 0.007). All subsequent
analyses were adjusted for BD score.
Theory-of-Mind and Psychotic Experiences. The children
with a low ToM score had an increased risk of having PE
compared to the children with high ToM score (adjusted
OR=1.6, 95%CI 1.1–2.3, x2(4) = 12.42 p= 0.010). The children
with HyperToM compared to the children with no HyperToM
also had an increased risk of PE (adjusted OR=1.8, 95%CI: 1.2–
2.7 x2(3) = 10.11) p= 0.006). The estimated risks of PE for poor
ToM and for HyperToM were within the same range with almost
identical 95% CIs (Table 3).
The adjusted OR for Pa in the HyperToM group versus the
group without HyperToM was 2.0 (95%CI: 1.1–3.7 x2(4) = 9.93
p= 0.021), whereas the adjusted OR for having PE-NonPa was
non-significant albeit directionally similar (Table 4). Post-estima-
tion analysis confirmed that the OR for the children with
HyperToM compared to those without HyperToM was signifi-
cantly higher for Pa than for PE-NonPa (x2 (2) = 7.96, p = 0.0187).
Sample II
Psychotic Experiences. Of the 259 children in the case-
control follow-up sample, 156 (60.2%) reported lifetime PE. The
further subgrouping of these 156 yielded a Pa group of 71 children
(46%) and a PE-NonPa group of 85 children (54%). Similar to
sample I there were no significant differences in either age or
gender between either the PE and Non-PE groups, or between the
Pa and PE-NonPa groups (Table 2).
Theory of Mind Frederik. The median ToM score was 21,
and the median number of mentalizing answers was 3 (Table 1).
Applying the same criteria for HyperToM as in sample I (i.e. cut-
offs: low ToM=ToM total score ,19, and High mentalizing =
number of mentalizing answers .3), 21 (8%) of the children in
sample II were classified as having HyperToM. A significantly
greater part of the group of children with HyperToM (81%) were
girls compared to the group of children without HyperToM (51%
x2(1) = 7.0293 p= 0.008). There were no age-differences between
the group with HyperToM (159 months) and without HyperToM
(159 months t(257) = 0.5699 p= 0.5692).
Proxy General Intelligence: School level. Among the 247
children with existing data at school level, there were no significant
differences in the percentages of the children attending pre-
academic school in the PE compared to the NonPE group.
However, significantly fewer children in the group of children with
Pa (46%) compared to the group of children with PE-NonPa (64%
x2(1) = 4.7688 p= 0.029) (table 2). Significantly fewer children
attended pre-academic education in (i) the low ToM (37%)
compared to the High ToM group (64% x2(1) = 17.3139 p,0.001)
and in (ii) the HyperToM (28%) compared to the non-HyperToM
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To avoid having to exclude from the analyses the 12 children, of
whom 8 had PE but missing data at school level, we first carried
out both adjusted and non-adjusted analyses for the smaller
sample of 247 children. As none of these analyses differed
substantially in terms of estimated effects or level of significance,
non-adjusted analyses were reported thus allowing inclusion of the
full sample of 259.
Theory-of-Mind and Psychotic Experiences. The children
with low ToM did not have a significantly increased risk of having
PE compared to the children with high ToM. The children with
HyperToM had an increased risk of PE compared to the children
without HyperToM (OR=4.6, 95%CI 1.3–16.2, x2 = (2)7.56
p= 0.018) (Table 3). The OR for Pa in the HyperToM group
versus the group without HyperToM was 6.2 (95%CI 1.7–23.,
p = 0.002), whereas the OR for having PE-NonPa was non-
significant albeit directionally similar (Table 4). Post-estimation
analysis confirmed that the OR for HyperToM was significantly
greater for Pa than PE-NonPa (x2 (2) = 7.96, p = 0.018).
Discussion
Findings
The main finding of the present study was that HyperToM was
associated more strongly with Pa than PE-NonPa. Confirming
hypothesis 3, the OR was 2.0 for Pa in sample I and 1.6 for PE-
NonPa, and in sample II the OR for Pa was 6.2 and 3.3 for PE-
NonPa. Thus the study documents a clear, replicated relationship
between an exaggerated theory of mind and paranoid symptoms
in childhood.
Our first hypothesis on PE being more frequent in children with
low ToM was confirmed in sample I as the odds for having PE was
1.6 times greater in the group of children with a low ToM score
than in the group of children with a high ToM score. However,
this was not the case in sample II, where no significant association
was apparent.
Hypothesis two on PE being particularly frequent in children
with HyperToM was confirmed, as the OR for having PE in both
samples was higher for the HyperToM group than for the group
without HyperToM. In sample I, the odds for PE was 1.8 times
greater in the HyperToM group versus the Non-HyperToM
group. In sample II, the corresponding estimate was a 4.6 times
greater risk for PE in the HyperToM group versus the non-
HyperToM group, while the risk of PE showed no significant
association with poor ToM abilities measured as an overall low
ToM score. Only in sample I, the odds of PE were within the same
range, and with overlapping CIs, for children with poor ToM and
for children with HyperToM.
ToM and development of psychosis
The results suggest that particularly the HyperToM type is
associated with PE, and that this association is strongest for
delusional ideas with paranoid content (Pa), i.e, delusions of
persecution, mind-reading and/or receiving messages from TV/
radio. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that while
general alterations in ToM may be a vulnerability marker for
psychosis, more specific types of alterations [29,47] may have a
mediating role in the development of different types of specific
symptoms.
Based on the work of Frith [48], it may be argued that
development of ToM abilities, including the awareness of
intentions of the self and others, is necessary in order to experience
ideas of reference and symptoms like mind reading. Clearly,
Table 3. Differences in frequency of Psychotic Experiences by ToM groups (and gender and measures of general cognition).
SAMPLE I Odds Ratio for having PE
OR 95% CI X2 p
MODEL 1
Gender 1.2 0.8–1.6 X2(4) = 12.42 0.361
Block Design 0.9 0.9–1.0 X2(4) = 12.42 0.254
ToM Scores
High Number of Mentalizing answers 1.6 1.1–2.6 X2(4) = 12.42 0.011
Low ToM Score 1.6 1.1–2.3 X2(4) = 12.42 0.010
MODEL 2
Gender 1.2 0.8–1.6 X2(3) = 10.11 0.347
Block Design 0.9 0.9–1.0 X2(3) = 10.11 0.165
HyperToM 1.8 1.2–2.7 X2(3) = 10.11 0.006
SAMPLE II Odds Ratio for having PE
OR 95%CI X2 p
MODEL 1
Gender 1.1 0.7–1.8 X2 (3) = 7.13 0.755
ToM Scores
High Number of Mentalizing answers 0.5 0.3–0.9 X2(3) = 7.13 0.021
Low ToM Score 0.9 0.5–1.8 X2((3) = 7.13 0.816
MODEL 2
Gender 0.8 0.5–1.4 X2 (2) = 7.56 0.479
HyperToM 4.6 1.3–16.2 X2(2) = 7.56 0.018
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0113082.t003
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paranoid patients have intact ToM in the sense that they know
that other people have mental states, but may perform poorly
because of their difficulties in accurately monitoring other people’s
intentions [40,49].
HyperToM may in part be stress-induced. Increased stress
responsiveness affects mentalizing capacity [50]. For example, a
recent study [51] found that high cortisol-responding women make
more mentalizing errors due to a tendency to develop HyperToM
after stress induction, thus demonstrating that the environment, in
the context of increased stress responsiveness, modulates the
functioning of ToM abilities. Frith [4,48] suggested that whereas
paranoid patients may have a normally functioning ToM when
asymptomatic, during acute illness, reduced ToM functioning may
lead to the belief that others have malevolent intentions [21]. Such
combinations of trait and state-like qualities have been reported
for other meta-cognitive mechanisms of psychotic symptoms such
as a jumping-to-conclusions reasoning style [52].
Due to the cross-sectional design of the present study, etiological
issues cannot be addressed. Future studies may examine how
HyperToM develops, and how it may be related to maturational
processes. HyperToM may be related to the inability to take
perspectives as suggested by Langdon and colleagues [53] or to a
tendency to overgeneralization of hypotheses, [29,32,34,54], but
these theories have yet to be tested in longitudinal studies.
A retrospective study of young patients with schizophrenia [55]
found an increased likelihood of delusional beliefs with age,
indicating that the formation of these symptoms from preadoles-
cence onwards depend on brain maturation and learning.
Similarly, HyperToM may also depend on brain maturation and
learning [56] The immaturity of the more advanced aspects of
ToM abilities in preadolescent children may increase the
likelihood of social misinterpretation, anxiety and formation of
paranoid and first-rank like delusional ideation that may ultimately
result in the persistence of PE [55].
Strengths and limitations
A main strength of the study is the fact that the hypotheses were
tested in two large, independent population-based samples from
two different countries. PE and ToM were assessed using the same
items and cut-offs. The age range was fixed around the onset of
puberty and was roughly the same in the two samples. Mean age
had no influence on any analysis.
There are, however, a few limitations that need to be
considered. First, we were not able to control for general cognition
with a measure of full IQ, but adjustment for appropriate proxy
measures of IQ did not substantially change any of the results.
Secondly, the psychometric properties of the ToM-F task have not
yet been examined extensively. Nevertheless, the internal consis-
tency of the task was found to be fair and comparable across the
samples, and the scores were close in range. Also, ToM-F is based
on the ToM Storybooks for younger children, which have good
psychometric qualities [39].
Finally, the cross-sectional design does not make it possible to
determine the direction of the relationships. Longitudinal studies
need to further explore the developmental trajectories of
HyperToM in childhood and adolescence and to assess both the
causal and temporal relationships between PE and HyperToM,
and the stability of HyperToM over time.
Conclusion
The current study is the first to demonstrate patterns of
association between specific alterations in ToM and psychotic
symptoms in a population-based sample of children. The findings
were replicated in a smaller, high prevalence study.
Our findings suggest that it may be productive to apply more
differentiated measures of ToM instead of relying on an overall
score based on number of correct answers. This could be helpful
not only when conducting research on the development of PE and
psychosis, but also when applying ToM tasks as part of a clinical
assessment in child mental health service settings.
The results contribute to the understanding of the relationship
between ToM and psychosis, which seems unlikely to be fully
explained by an association between poor ToM and a state of
psychosis. The current study points to the possibility of different
alterations in ToM impacting on different stages of development of
psychosis.
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